

# AI-01903 BookNotes Studies in the Way of Words

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## 1. Detailed Briefing Document

### Title: Paul Grice's Contributions to Philosophy of Language and Logic: A Summary

#### Author and Work:

This document summarizes key ideas from **Paul Grice's** collection of essays, "**Studies in the Way of Words**," published by Harvard University Press in 1989, with earlier essays dating back to the 1950s and 60s. Grice's work explores the philosophy of language, logic, and meaning, among other philosophical concerns.

#### Core Philosophical Project:

Grice's primary aim is to **provide an accurate general account of the actual meaning of expressions in nontechnical discourse**. This involves drawing a **distinction between meaning and use** and determining the limits of its philosophical utility, which, in turn, necessitates the search for a systematic philosophical theory of language.

#### The "A-Philosopher's Maneuver" and Grice's Critique:

Grice identifies a common "maneuver" in conceptual inquiries, referred to as the "A-philosopher's maneuver".

- **Description:** This maneuver starts by observing that expressions (E(a)) are not used in certain situations, or their use would be "odd or inappropriate or even

would make no sense". It then suggests that these situations fail to satisfy some condition C, and concludes that C is a characteristic of the concept expressed by 'a', a feature of its meaning or use. Such conclusions might claim that E(a) **logically entails C, implies or presupposes C**, or that C is an **applicability/appropriateness-condition** for 'a'.

- **Grice's Stance:** While acknowledging the maneuver's utility, Grice points to philosophical mistakes arising from its uncritical application, particularly regarding confusing meaning and use. He considers most of the examples he discusses as **suspect and, in his view, illegitimate applications**.
- **Suspect Examples:**
  - **"Know":** Malcolm's claim that part of "know" implies an inquiry is underway.
  - **"Remember":** Benjamin's view that if one has not forgotten 'p', it follows one remembers 'p', making "I've remembered my name again" absurd in its usual sense.
  - **"Tried":** The idea that "A tried to do x" is only correctly used if A failed or did x with difficulty. Grice argues this condition is too strong.
  - **"Carefully":** The suggestion that "A performed x carefully" requires A to be alert to things going astray and to take reasonable steps. Grice questions if reluctance to apply "carefully" in certain cases (e.g., counting notes 15 times) stems from meaning restriction or other factors.
  - **Pseudo-descriptive Devices:** The philosophical taste for representing descriptive words (like "true," "know," "good") as primarily performing speech-acts (e.g., "to say 'I know' is to give one's word").

### **Conversational Implicature – Grice's Alternative:**

Grice proposes

**conversational implicature** as a key concept to explain linguistic phenomena without multiplying senses or positing overly complex meanings.

- **Distinction between "Saying" and "Implicating":** What a speaker *says* is closely related to the conventional meaning of the words uttered. What is *implicated* (suggested, implied) is distinct from what is said.

- **Cooperative Principle (CP):** Talk exchanges are typically **cooperative efforts** with a shared purpose or direction. Participants are expected to "**Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange**". This principle has analogues in non-talk transactions (e.g., mending a car).
- **Conversational Maxims:** Four categories guide conversational contributions:
  - **Quantity:**
    1. Make your contribution **as informative as is required**.
    2. Do not make your contribution **more informative than is required** (this maxim is disputable).
  - **Quality (Supermaxim: "Try to make your contribution one that is true"):**
    1. **Do not say what you believe to be false.**
    2. **Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.**
  - **Relation:**
    1. **Be relevant.**
  - **Manner (Supermaxim: "Be perspicuous"):**
    1. **Avoid obscurity of expression.**
    2. **Avoid ambiguity.**
    3. **Be brief** (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
    4. **Be orderly.**
- **Failing to Fulfill a Maxim:**
  - **Violating:** Quietly and unostentatiously, possibly misleading.
  - **Opting Out:** Explicitly indicating unwillingness to cooperate.
  - **Clash:** Unable to fulfill one maxim without violating another (e.g., being informative vs. having adequate evidence).
  - **Flouting (Exploiting):** Blatantly failing to fulfill a maxim, leading the hearer to infer an implicature to preserve the assumption that the speaker is observing the CP.

- *Examples:* Testimonial letter (lack of detail implies negativity); tautologies ("Women are women"); overly detailed description ("produced a series of sounds...").
- **Properties of Conversational Implicatures:** Nonconventional, cancelable (can be explicitly or contextually negated without contradiction), and often non-detachable (cannot be detached by substituting synonyms).

### **Speaker's Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Word Meaning:**

Grice distinguishes between

**utterer's occasion-meaning** (what a speaker means by an utterance on a specific occasion) and **timeless meaning** (the conventional meaning of an utterance-type, like a word or sentence).

- **Utterer's Occasion-Meaning:** Is explicated in terms of an **utterer's intentions**. A speaker U means something by uttering x if U intends an audience A to produce a particular response (r), A to recognize U's intention to produce r, and A to fulfill r *on the basis of* this recognition. This definition is refined to address various counterexamples.
  - Grice's later view suggests the M-intended effect for indicative utterances is that the hearer should **think the utterer believes something**, rather than directly inducing belief.
- **Timeless Meaning:** (e.g., "For U, HW means 'I know the route'") is explicated as U having a "policy (practice, habit) to utter HW if U intends (wants) A to think that U thinks U knows the route". This connects word/sentence meaning back to speaker intentions.
- **Natural vs. Nonnatural Meaning:**
  - **Natural Meaning:** (e.g., "Those black clouds mean rain") is **factive** (if x means y, then y is true) and cannot be specified using quotation marks. Consequences are states of affairs.
  - **Nonnatural Meaning (meaning<sub>NN</sub>):** (e.g., "His gesture meant that he was fed up") is **nonfactive** (the speaker is not committed to the truth of what is meant) and can be specified using quotation marks. Consequences are conceptions. This is the focus for communication. The intended effect must be something within the audience's control.

## Specific Applications and Debates:

- **Indicative Conditionals ("if p then q"):** Grice argues "if p then q" is **identical in sense with "p  $\supset$  q"** (material conditional). The apparent "Indirectness Condition" (non-truth-functional grounds for accepting "p  $\supset$  q") is a **generalized conversational implicature**, arising from the maxim of Quantity (choosing a weaker statement) and clash with Quality (lack of evidence for a stronger statement). This implicature is cancelable.
- **Definite Descriptions ("The king of France is bald"):** The existential implication (that there is a unique king of France) is treated as a **conversational implicature** arising from a maxim of Manner: "Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply". Using the abbreviated form (e.g., "The king of France is bald") implies that the speaker expects denial to be wholesale or that existential clauses are noncontroversial "common ground". This implicature is cancelable and contextually cancelable.
- **Analytic/Synthetic Distinction:** Grice (and Strawson) defend the distinction against Quine's criticisms. They argue Quine's demands for explanation are too strict and that the distinction is intuitively available and explainable informally. They maintain that revisability of statements (Quine's point) is consistent with the distinction, provided one differentiates between admitting falsity and changing concepts.
- **Perception (Causal Theory of Perception - CTP):** Grice suggests that "sense-data" are theoretical constructs introduced by theorists, not elements of reality. He explores the idea that X perceives M if X's sense-impression is causally dependent on M. This involves distinguishing senses (e.g., sight, touch) by the properties they detect or the mechanisms involved, rather than solely by introspectible experiences.
- **Conceptual Analysis and Ordinary Language:** Grice champions the study of **ordinary language** as a **primary philosophical concern**, especially through "linguistic botanizing" (systematic study of word use, identifying proprieties and improprieties). He argues it allows philosophers to clarify concepts and test theories by identifying counterexamples.

## Methodological Principles:

- **Modified Occam's Razor:** "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity". This principle guides against positing new senses for words when phenomena can be explained by other means, such as implicature.
  - **Intentionality:** Intentional concepts (intending, believing) are fundamental to the theory of meaning and language, arguing against purely extensional accounts.
  - **Teleological Approach:** Explaining concepts by considering their purpose or function, especially in the context of rational behavior and communication.
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## 2. Study Guide: Paul Grice's Philosophy of Language

This study guide outlines key concepts and arguments from Paul Grice's "Studies in the Way of Words."

### I. Foundational Ideas: Meaning, Use, and Conceptual Inquiry

- **Meaning vs. Use:** Grice's central project is to accurately account for the meaning of expressions, distinguishing it from their use.
- **The "A-Philosopher's Maneuver":** Understand this problematic approach to conceptual analysis.
  - **Mechanism:** Observe odd/inappropriate use → identify unmet condition (C) → conclude C is part of meaning/use.
  - **Grice's Critique:** Often leads to philosophical mistakes; he seeks a method to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate applications.
  - **Examples:** "Know," "remember," "try," "carefully," and pseudo-descriptive speech acts.

### II. Communication and Implicature: Grice's Core Contribution

- **Distinction: What is Said vs. What is Implicated:**
  - **Said:** Closely tied to the conventional meaning of uttered words.
  - **Implicated:** What is suggested or implied, distinct from what is said.
- **Types of Implicature:**

- **Conventional Implicature:** Implicated by virtue of the conventional meaning of certain words (e.g., "but").
- **Nonconventional Implicature:** Not based on conventional meaning.
  - **Conversational Implicature:** A subclass of nonconventional, essentially connected with general features of discourse.
- **The Cooperative Principle (CP):**
  - **Core Idea:** Talk exchanges are rational, cooperative efforts with a common purpose or direction.
  - **Formulation:** "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged".
- **Conversational Maxims (Categories & Maxims):** Principles that generally yield results in accordance with the CP.
  - **Quantity:**
    1. **Be as informative as required.**
    2. **Do not be more informative than required.** (Debatable maxim).
  - **Quality:** (Supermaxim: "Try to make your contribution one that is true")
    1. **Do not say what you believe to be false.**
    2. **Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence..**
  - **Relation:**
    1. **Be relevant..**
  - **Manner:** (Supermaxim: "Be perspicuous")
    1. **Avoid obscurity of expression.**
    2. **Avoid ambiguity.**
    3. **Be brief** (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
    4. **Be orderly..**
- **Ways of Failing to Fulfill Maxims:**

- **Violating:** Quietly and unostentatiously, possibly misleading.
- **Opting Out:** Indicating unwillingness to cooperate (e.g., "My lips are sealed").
- **Clash:** Unable to fulfill one maxim without violating another.
- **Flouting (Exploiting):** Blatantly failing to fulfill a maxim, leading the hearer to infer an implicature. This is a key mechanism for generating conversational implicatures.
  - *Example: Testimonial letter (lack of positive information implies negative judgment).*
  - *Example: Saying "There is a garage round the corner" when asked about petrol (implicates the garage is open/has petrol via Relevance).*
- **Properties of Conversational Implicatures:**
  - **Nonconventional:** Not part of the conventional meaning of the words.
  - **Cancelable:** Can be explicitly or contextually negated without contradiction.
  - **Non-Detachable (often):** Cannot be detached by substituting synonyms if the implicature depends on the content of what is said.

### III. Meaning, Intentions, and Language

- **Utterer's Occasion-Meaning:**
  - **Definition:** What a speaker (U) means by an utterance (x) is explained in terms of U's complex **intentions** regarding an audience (A) and a response (r). This involves nested intentions (e.g., U intends A to produce r, A to recognize U's intention, and A's production of r to be based on this recognition).
  - **Refinements:** Subsequent definitions address counterexamples (e.g., torture, showing Salome a head) by adding further conditions.
  - **Role of Propositional Attitudes:** The M-intended effect is often the generation of a propositional attitude (e.g., belief, intention). For indicative utterances, the speaker intends the hearer to **think the utterer believes something**.

- **Timeless Meaning (Sentence-Meaning, Word-Meaning):**
  - **Definition:** For an utterance-type X to have a timeless meaning (e.g., "For U, HW means 'I know the route'") means U has a "policy (practice, habit) to utter X if U intends (wants) A to have a certain propositional attitude (e.g., think U knows the route)".
  - **Relationship to Speaker's Meaning:** What words mean is understood in terms of what people *mean by* them; the unrelativized (timeless) notion is posterior to the relativized (speaker's) notion.
- **Natural vs. Nonnatural Meaning:**
  - **Tests:** Factivity (natural is factive, nonnatural is nonfactive) and use of quotation marks (appropriate for nonnatural).
  - **Underlying Idea:** Both relate to "consequence" – natural to states of affairs, nonnatural to conceptions.

#### IV. Specific Philosophical Debates and Applications

- **Conditionals ("if p then q"):**
  - **Grice's Thesis:** "if p then q" is logically equivalent to the material conditional " $p \supset q$ ".
  - **"Indirectness Condition":** The implication that there are non-truth-functional grounds for accepting the conditional is a **conversational implicature**. It's cancelable.
- **Definite Descriptions (e.g., "The king of France is bald"):**
  - **Existential Implication:** The implication that a unique entity exists (e.g., a unique King of France) is a **conversational implicature**, not part of the conventional meaning of the logical form.
  - **Mechanism:** Arises from a maxim of Manner (framing assertions to facilitate appropriate replies), implying existential components are common ground or non-controversial.
  - **Cancelability:** Can be explicitly or contextually canceled.
- **Analytic/Synthetic Distinction:**

- **Defense Against Quine:** Grice (and Strawson) argue that Quine's criticism of the distinction (e.g., "bachelor" vs. "unmarried man") is based on overly stringent demands for formal definition and an inconsistent view of synonymy.
- **Conceptual Revision:** The distinction can be maintained even if all statements are revisable, by distinguishing between admitting falsity and changing concepts.
- **Perception (Causal Theory of Perception - CTP):**
  - **Sense-data:** Grice suggests they are theoretical constructs, not fundamental entities.
  - **Perceiving:** Involves a causal link between the perceived object and sense-impressions.

## V. Philosophical Method and Outlook

- **Conceptual Analysis:** Involves clarifying concepts by identifying general characteristics of their use and testing them with real or imagined cases (e.g., "justice," "battle").
- **Linguistic Botany:** Systematic study of ordinary language, including lexical entries, idioms, and syntax, to uncover linguistic proprieties and improprieties, and to make explicit overarching concepts.
- **Modified Occam's Razor:** "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity". A guiding principle for preferring implicature explanations over positing new senses.
- **Role of Intentionality:** Intentions are crucial foundational elements in explicating meaning, resisting purely extensional accounts.

## 3. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

**Q1: What is Paul Grice's main goal in "Studies in the Way of Words"? A1:** Grice's main goal is to **provide an accurate general account of the actual meaning of expressions in nontechnical discourse**. He seeks to clarify the **distinction between meaning and use** and to develop a systematic philosophical theory of language.

**Q2: What is the "A-philosopher's maneuver" that Grice discusses, and why is he critical of it?****A2:** The "A-philosopher's maneuver" is a common approach where philosophers observe expressions being used inappropriately in certain situations, suggest a missing condition (C), and then conclude that **condition C is a characteristic feature of the expression's meaning or use**. Grice is critical because he believes that uncritically applying this maneuver often leads to philosophical mistakes by confusing meaning and use, and that most such applications are **illegitimate**.

**Q3: What is the fundamental difference between "what is said" and "what is implicated" in Grice's theory?****A3:** **What is said** is directly tied to the **conventional meaning of the words** a speaker utters. It's the literal content of the utterance. **What is implicated** (or an implicature) is what the speaker **suggests, hints, or means** in addition to, or instead of, what is literally said, and it is distinct from the conventional meaning of the words themselves.

**Q4: What is the Cooperative Principle, and how does it relate to communication?****A4:** The **Cooperative Principle (CP)** is a fundamental idea that talk exchanges are typically **rational and cooperative efforts**. It states: "**Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged**". It's the overarching principle that guides and makes sense of conversational interactions, implying that participants are working towards a common goal.

**Q5: What are the four categories of Conversational Maxims, and can you give an example of flouting one?****A5:** The four categories of Conversational Maxims are **Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner**. Flouting a maxim means blatantly failing to fulfill it, which characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicature because the hearer assumes the speaker is still observing the Cooperative Principle.

- **Example of Flouting Quantity:** A letter of recommendation for a philosophy job reads: "Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc." By providing *less information than required* (flouting the first maxim of Quantity), the writer implicates that Mr. X is not good at philosophy, as they are deliberately omitting relevant positive information.

**Q6: How does Grice define "meaning" in terms of intentions?A6:** Grice's concept of **utterer's occasion-meaning** (what a speaker means on a specific occasion) is defined through a series of complex, nested intentions. Roughly, for a speaker U to mean something by uttering x, U must intend an audience A to produce a certain response (r), A to **recognize** U's intention to produce r, and A to produce r **on the basis of this recognition**. For indicative statements, the intended effect is often for A to **think U believes something**, rather than directly inducing A's belief.

**Q7: What is the difference between "natural meaning" and "nonnatural meaning" (meaning<sub>NN</sub>)?A7:**

- **Natural meaning** (e.g., "Those black clouds mean rain") is **factive**, meaning if 'x means y' is true, then 'y' must also be true. It cannot be comfortably expressed using quotation marks for 'y'.
- **Nonnatural meaning (meaning<sub>NN</sub>)** (e.g., "His gesture meant that he was fed up") is **nonfactive**, meaning 'x means<sub>NN</sub> y' can be true even if 'y' is false. It can be specified using quotation marks. This is the sense of "mean" relevant to human communication.

**Q8: How does Grice explain the "Indirectness Condition" often associated with "if...then" statements?A8:** Grice argues that the common impression that "if p then q" implies some non-truth-functional connection or reason between p and q (the "Indirectness Condition") is **not part of the conventional meaning of "if"**, which he equates with the material conditional ( $p \supset q$ ). Instead, this is a **generalized conversational implicature**. It arises because stating " $p \supset q$ " is logically weaker and less informative than other options, and the speaker, by choosing this weaker form, implicates a lack of stronger evidence, assuming they are still being cooperative. This implicature is **cancelable**.

**Q9: How does Grice handle the existential implications of definite descriptions, like in "The king of France is bald"?A9:** Grice views the implication of a unique existence (e.g., that there is a unique king of France) in sentences with definite descriptions as a **conversational implicature**, not an entailment of the conventional meaning. He suggests it arises from a maxim of Manner: speakers frame their assertions in a way that facilitates appropriate replies. By using an abbreviated form (like "The king of France is bald" instead of a full Russellian

expansion), the speaker implies that the existential components are **noncontroversial common ground**. This implicature is **cancelable**.

**Q10: What is Grice's "Modified Occam's Razor"?A10:** Grice proposes "Modified Occam's Razor" as a regulative principle: "**Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity**". This means that one should not assume a word has a new, derivative sense unless that assumption does explanatory work (e.g., explains why certain applications are easy or why others are uncomfortable). It encourages explaining linguistic phenomena through conversational implicature rather than positing new ambiguities or meanings for words.

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## 4. Timeline

This timeline highlights key publication dates and conceptual developments mentioned within the provided sources, particularly focusing on Paul Grice's essays.

- **1956:**
  - **Essay 13, "In Defense of a Dogma,"** first published in *The Philosophical Review*. This essay, co-authored with P.F. Strawson, defends the analytic/synthetic distinction against Quine.
- **1957:**
  - **Essay 14, "Meaning,"** first published in *The Philosophical Review*. This seminal article introduces the distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning (meaning<sub>NN</sub>) and an early account of meaning in terms of utterer's intentions.
- **1961:**
  - **Essay 15, "Causal Theory of Perception,"** first published in *The Aristotelian Society: Proceedings, Supplementary Volume*. It later served to introduce the notion of conversational implicature.
- **1962:**
  - **Essay 16, "Analytical Philosophy,"** first published in a volume edited by R. J. Butler. This essay includes "Two Models for Conversational Implicature".
- **1968:**

- **Essay 6, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning,"** first published in *Foundations of Language*. This essay analyzes the quartet of meaning conceptions and how word meaning connects to speaker meaning.
- **1969:**
  - **Essay 5, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions,"** first published in *The Philosophical Review*. It delves deeper into the explication of utterer's occasion-meaning in terms of intentions and addresses counterexamples.
- **1975:**
  - **Essay 2, "Logic and Conversation,"** first published in *Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3*. This essay formally introduces the **Cooperative Principle** and the **Conversational Maxims** (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Manner), and defines **Conversational Implicature**.
- **1978:**
  - **Essay 3, "Further Notes on Logic and Conversation,"** first published in *Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9*. This essay elaborates on the concepts from Essay 2, discussing features of conversational implicatures like cancelability and non-detachability.
- **1981:**
  - **Essay 17** first published in *Radical Pragmatics*. This essay explores a "bracketing device" to deal with problems of presupposition and Russell's Theory of Descriptions.
- **1982:**
  - **Essay 18, "Meaning Revisited,"** first published in *Mutual Knowledge*. This essay reflects on the relationship between speaker's meaning and meaning in a language, and the natural/nonnatural meaning distinction.
- **1989:**
  - **"Studies in the Way of Words"** published by Harvard University Press. This is the compilation of Grice's essays.
- **1991:**

- First Harvard University Press paperback edition of "Studies in the Way of Words".
- **1995:**
  - Fourth Printing of "Studies in the Way of Words".

List 50 Lessons or Guiding Principles

1. **Be cautious of drawing conclusions about meaning solely from appropriateness of use.**
2. **Distinguish between meaning and use, and understand the limits of this distinction.**
3. **Develop a method to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate applications of conceptual inquiries.**
4. **Differentiate between utterances that are inappropriate because they are false and those inappropriate for other reasons.**
5. **Seek a systematic philosophical theory of language to order linguistic phenomena.**
6. **Question claims that a word's meaning implies a condition if its absence makes the utterance "odd" but still arguably true.**
7. **Be wary of conditions that deny a word's application to naturally regarded paradigm cases.**
8. **Context and speaker's knowledge can influence the appropriateness of an utterance, not necessarily its truth-value.**
9. **The appropriateness of applying modifying adverbs in standard situations may be due to the unremarkableness of the statement, not falsity.**
10. **Test linguistic claims by examining the truth-value of their negations when conditions are unfulfilled.**
11. **Test linguistic claims by finding complex sentences where the crucial word is appropriate even without the suspect condition.**
12. **Consider alternative explanations for linguistic inappropriateness beyond meaning restrictions.**

13. **Do not equate inadmissibility of application with lack of truth-value without strong justification.**
14. **Recognize that speaker-relative conditions often explain inappropriateness, not lack of truth-value.**
15. **Avoid denying that two uses of a sentence make the same statement if only context changes appropriateness.**
16. **Avoid claiming that a statement's truth-value can change based on context.**
17. **Recognize that natural language counterparts of formal logical devices may "diverge" in meaning.**
18. **Do not always view divergences in natural language from formal logic as "imperfections".**
19. **Language serves many purposes beyond scientific inquiry; intelligibility doesn't always require precise definition.**
20. **In communication, identify what is "said" (conventional meaning) separately from what is "implicated" (conveyed but not explicitly said).**
21. **Adhere to the Cooperative Principle in communication, expecting others to do so.**
22. **Make contributions as informative as required, no more, no less.**
23. **Strive for truthfulness and adequate evidence in communication (Quality).**
24. **Be relevant in conversational contributions (Relation).**
25. **Be perspicuous in communication: avoid obscurity, ambiguity, prolixity, and be orderly (Manner).**
26. **Understand how failing to fulfill maxims (violation, opting out, clash, flouting) can generate implicatures.**
27. **Identify conversational implicatures by analyzing conventional meaning, context, background knowledge, and the Cooperative Principle.**
28. **Understand that patent tautologies are non-informative at the level of what is said, but informative at the level of what is implicated.**

29. **Flouting a maxim can create an implicature (e.g., irony, metaphor, meiosis, hyperbole).**
30. **Deliberate ambiguity can convey multiple interpretations simultaneously.**
31. **Apply "Modified Occam's Razor": Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.**
32. **Presume a word to have a less restrictive meaning rather than a more restrictive one when choice is possible.**
33. **Meaning (nonnatural) can be understood in terms of an utterer's intentions to produce a response by means of the audience's recognition of that intention.**
34. **The intended effect (response) in communication is often the generation of some propositional attitude (e.g., belief, intention).**
35. **The intended effect in communication should be something within the audience's control.**
36. **In judging linguistic intentions, rely on criteria similar to non-linguistic intentions, including explicit plans, general usage, and context.**
37. **Intensional concepts (like intending and believing) are essential for a rich theory of language and meaning.**
38. **Recognize a clear distinction between "natural" meaning (factive, non-quotable) and "nonnatural" meaning (non-factive, quotable, related to communication).**
39. **The overarching idea behind both natural and nonnatural meaning is "consequence".**
40. **An adequate theory of meaning should account for the relation between speaker's meaning and meaning in a language.**
41. **Philosophical analysis should involve analyzing and describing the ordinary use of expressions, noting both willingness and unwillingness to use them in various situations.**
42. **Do not reject ordinary statements as false or absurd merely on philosophical grounds; there's a strong presumption that they are correct.**

43. **Conceptual analysis seeks a general characterization of how an expression is applied, relying on one's ability to apply/withhold it in particular cases.**
44. **Conceptual analysis is not a sociological inquiry; it focuses on one's own use and assumes general applicability unless significant differences are found.**
45. **Ambiguity, misleadingness, and vagueness in ordinary language do not prevent conceptual analysis, but rather may be clarified by it.**
46. **Philosophers should inquire into why we use expressions in a certain way, and whether alternative linguistic structures are possible.**
47. **The existence of widely agreed philosophical usage for terms suggests the existence of the distinction they mark.**
48. **A distinction's existence is not disproved merely by failures to clarify it adequately.**
49. **The notion of value is crucial to the idea of rationality.**
50. **The absence of "sneaky intentions" is a key requirement for attributing speaker meaning.**